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OPINION OF THE COURT 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Cassandra Paul appeals the District Court’s grant of a motion for summary 
judgment.  She asserts error by the District Court for dismissing various claims under 
Title VII,
1
 Americans with Disabilities Act,
2
 and the Virgin Islands Civil Rights Act.
3
  
We will affirm.   
 As this opinion lacks any precedential value, we write only for the benefit of the 
parties whose familiarity with the case obviates the need for a full recitation of the facts 
and procedural history.  We exercise plenary review to the District Court’s grant of a 
motion for summary judgment.  Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604, 611 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
 We easily dispose of Paul’s contention that the District Court wrongly applied a 
“but-for” standard, rather than a “motivating factor” test to review her Title VII, gender 
discrimination claims.  The District Court explicitly stated that it was the plaintiff’s 
                                              
1
 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2. 
 
2
 42 U.S.C. §§ 12112. 
 
3
 10 V.I.C. § 64.    
3 
 
burden to demonstrate pretext by showing a factual dispute that discrimination was “more 
likely than not a motivating factor.”  Its analysis was consistent with this standard.   
 As to the discrimination claims, we first consider Paul’s assertion that Hovensa 
failed on two of her requests for accommodation under the ADA.
4
  Upon our review of 
the record we conclude that the undisputed facts undermine both of her prima facie 
claims for accommodation.   
 Though Paul pressed a claim for failure to accommodate her mobility needs, the 
District Court cited to numerous attempts by Hovensa to meet Paul’s request for work-
site transportation.  In light of these efforts, we conclude that Hovensa’s denial of her 
preferred accommodation, permission to drive her car onto terminal grounds, does not 
ground a prima facie case.   
 As to her request for an automatic door at her workplace, there is no dispute that 
its installation took quite some time to accomplish.  However, Paul did not build a factual 
record to challenge Hovensa’s account of efforts they made to acquire and install the 
door, nor did she proffer any evidence to reasonably infer bad faith delay.  This, coupled 
with the fact that Hovensa actually installed the door, made Paul’s assertion of an ADA 
violation wholly inadequate.  The District Court properly dismissed the accommodation 
claims. 
                                              
4
 Paul also claims on appeal that Hovensa failed to accommodate her disability by 
refusing to change the demands placed upon Oil Movement Coordinators (OMCs), and 
by failing to laterally transfer her to a different position.  Additionally, Paul raises a 
general claim that Hovensa failed to modify its facilities to meet ADA accessibility 
requirements.  She did not raise these claims before the District Court and we will not 
consider them. 
4 
 
 Paul next asserts Title VII, ADA, and VICRA violations based upon Hovensa’s 
failure to promote her to a supervisor position.
5
  There are a number of allegations 
associated with these claims. 
 Paul emphasizes on appeal that, as to her application for promotion, Hovensa 
disadvantaged her on the basis of gender and disability by refusing in prior years to give 
her opportunities to “act up” as a temporary terminal dispatcher.  Contrary to her 
representation to this Court, Hovensa did not flatly deny Paul the opportunity to “act up.”  
Paul admitted in deposition that, after she complained of being passed over to “act up,” 
she accepted Hovensa’s subsequent offers to work as a temporary dispatcher.  She also 
asserts that Hovensa showed discriminatory intent by ignoring her years of experience as 
an Oil Movement Coordinator (OMC).  Yet, given that the interviewed applicants met the 
minimum requirements for the position, Paul failed to ground any reasonable inference 
that Hovensa’s assessment of their distinct work experiences strayed beyond the proper 
bounds of business judgment.   
 Paul next maintains that Hovensa interviewers arbitrarily used co-worker 
animosity, that she links to her disability, to grade her “people skills” as inferior to the 
applicant Hovensa promoted.
6
  We did find evidence suggesting an interviewer knew that 
                                              
5
 Paul did not appeal the dismissal of her claim regarding a superintendent position.  
 
6
 Paul also casts Hovensa’s evaluation of the promoted employee’s “people skills” as 
evidence of discriminatory intent.  She points to criminal charges filed against the other 
applicant at the time of the interview, for which he was ultimately acquitted.  Paul asserts 
that Hovensa’s failure to account for these charges when it evaluated the employee 
demonstrated a general disdain of woman among Hovensa management.  However, there 
is no reasonable basis to draw such an inference.     
5 
 
some fellow employees disliked having to drive Paul on-site to accommodate her 
mobility needs.  However, even granting her every favorable inference, an interviewer’s 
awareness of the attitudes of some co-workers on this single issue—linked solely by 
Paul’s speculation to Hovensa’s decision to promote another employee—is far too 
attenuated to credibly ground a claim of pretext.
7
  Similarly, Paul alleges that Hovensa 
did not promote her to spare itself additional costs of new accommodations that would 
have been necessary to make the work space encompassed by this job compliant with the 
ADA.  There is simply no evidence to raise this claim above the level of bald conjecture.   
 With the dearth of evidence in this record to support an assertion of pretext, we 
conclude that the District Court properly dismissed Paul’s disability-based failure to 
promote claim.  Moreover, given our assessment of the record on her gender-based 
claims, the remaining evidence (the gender of the interviewers and the percentage of 
female supervisors) was insufficient to take Paul’s Title VII and VICRA pretext claims to 
trial.  The District Court did not err. 
 As to Paul’s ADA and Title VII claims arising from her termination, the District 
Court correctly concluded that these were unrelated to her EEOC claims and that, as a 
result, she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies.  These causes were properly 
dismissed. 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
7
 Hovensa was not obligated here to show the necessity of its evaluative criteria.   
6 
 
 Finally, Paul failed to proffer any evidence of Hovensa’s fraud or bad faith to 
support her claim of breach of good faith and fair dealing arising from her termination.  
Her cause relies purely upon speculation.  We conclude that this claim is meritless. 
 For all of these reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
